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 Executive Summary 
 
  There is a large empirical literature that investigates the effects of unbundling 
requirements on broadband operators’ incentives to invest in infrastructure. To date, that 
literature has generally relied on industry-wide data as an indicator of how the representative 
operator reacts to the imposition of mandatory unbundling. In this paper, we present original 
findings on how specific firms reacted to the removal of an unbundling obligation—that is, an 
act of “regulatory forbearance”—either for an existing access technology or for a new access 
technology. We rely on three case studies to evaluate the impact of regulatory forbearance on 
specific incumbents and entrants that were directly affected by the regulator’s decision. Our 
findings from the first case study appear to undermine the so-called “stepping stone” justification 
for unbundling an existing access technology (for example, the copper loop). In particular, there 
is a large discontinuity in the investment by entrants around the date of forbearance, in contrast 
to the steady movement up the “ladder of investment” predicted by the stepping stone 
hypothesis. Such a discontinuity suggests that either (1) the regulator failed to signal its 
deregulatory intentions to entrants, or (2) that the signal was clear but the entrant did not react 
according to the theory. We also find that incumbent investment increases significantly in 
response to forbearance from regulating a new access technology (for example, fiber loops). 
When forbearing from regulating an existing access technology, regulators can signal their future 
intentions to entrants by slowly increasing the regulated wholesale rate. In the case of forbearing 
from regulating a new technology, however, there is no equivalent mechanism by which 
regulators can signal their deregulatory intentions to incumbents. Because a regulator cannot 
credibly signal its commitment to industry participants, and because such a commitment is 
critical to the practical success of the stepping stone theory, the best policy for maximizing 
investment is to accelerate the date of forbearance for existing and new access technologies. 
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The central premise behind regulatory policies that require incumbent 
network owners to share their facilities at regulated rates is the so-called 
“stepping stone hypothesis,” which suggests that mandated sharing can create a 
set of “stepping stones”—or “rungs” on a “ladder of investment”—that allow 
entrants to invest gradually in their own facilities. According to the stepping 
stone hypothesis, unbundling allows entrants to gain a foothold at the lower 
rungs of the investment ladder using (for example) bitstream access, and then 
climb gradually up the ladder by investing in their own DSLAMs and ATM 
switches, ultimately replicating the incumbent’s entire access network.
1
The success of the stepping stone approach depends on the regulator’s ability 
to determine which portions of the incumbent’s network should be subject to 
mandatory unbundling and to set access prices at economically correct levels. If 
elements that cannot economically be replicated are excluded from sharing, or if 
access prices are set too high, entrants may never get past the first stone (or up 
the first rung)—that is, they may not enter at all. Alternatively, if sharing is 
applied to elements that entrants could economically replicate, or if access prices 
are set too low, both entrants and incumbents will have insufficient incentives to 
invest in new infrastructure. 
Striking the right balance is a difficult task. First, the regulator must identify 
the correct “rung” on the ladder at which to implement unbundling 
requirements—that is, the regulator must mandate access for those elements (and 
only those elements) that cannot yet economically be replicated by entrants, but 
could in the reasonably near future. Second, the regulator must set access prices 
for those elements based on their forward-looking costs, taking into account the 
 
1.   Martin Cave, Encouraging Infrastructure via the Ladder of Investment, 30 TELECOM. 
POL’Y 223-37 (2006). 
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options value entrants receive for avoiding the risks of making the investment 
themselves. Third, and crucially, the regulator must adjust access prices upwards 
at a pace that reflects the entrant’s increasing ability to rely on its own facilities 
(and provides the correct incentives for it to do so);
2 and, once entrants have 
climbed a rung, the regulator must remove the unbundling requirement for that 
element altogether.
3 All of these decisions are complicated by the facts that 
entrants enter the market at different times and use different technologies, and 
thus are likely to have different cost structures.  
To successfully induce the entrant to invest in its own facilities, the regulator 
must understand precisely the entrant’s investment calculus—that is, the 
economics of its “make or buy” decision. If one ignores the sunk cost nature of 
investments in telecommunications networks, the entrant’s investment decision 
turns purely on whether it can self-supply at a lower cost than the regulated 
access rate. But sunk costs introduce another factor, namely the entrant’s ability 
to avoid risk by avoiding making a sunk cost investment. As Martin Cave, an 
architect of the “ladder of investment theory,” explains, the value of this reduced 
risk, or “options value,” depends not only on the size of the sunk cost component 
of the investment, but also future events, such as the degree of demand 
uncertainty, and the expected change in input and output prices.
4 If the wholesale 
rate fails to account for the options value of avoiding a sunk cost investment, 
both entrants’ and incumbents’ incentives will be biased against investment.  
All of these factors suggest that setting the correct access price at a point in 
time is difficult. As noted above, however, regulators need to do more: They 
must gradually adjust access prices upwards until they converge to the voluntary 
price—that is, the point at which entrants are expected to have replicated the 
facilities subject to sharing and no longer require mandated access at rates below 
the voluntary exchange price. The need for such ongoing adjustments, combined 
with the existence of lags between investment decisions and infrastructure 
deployment, forces both incumbents and entrants to make decisions on the basis 
of their expectations  about  future regulatory policy. For example, if entrants 
believe that regulators will adjust wholesale prices “too slowly,” they will be 
reluctant to move to the higher rungs of the investment ladder—even if prices 
have been set at the economically correct levels to begin with.  
Thus, the decisions of both entrants and incumbents about the level of 
infrastructure investment in each period depend on their expectations regarding 
 
2.    Ultimately, these adjustments should cause the mandated price to converge with the 
voluntary exchange price, at which point the price constraint is no longer binding. The access price, 
A, at which the incumbent will voluntarily serve as a wholesaler solves the equality A – CW = PR – 
CR – CW, where CW is equal to the wholesale cost per line per month, PR is the retail price per line 
per month, and CR is the retail cost per line per month. 
3.   See Cave at 233-34 (describing each of these steps). 
4.   Id. at 234. Before accounting for the option value, the entrant will invest whenever P > (r 
+ α + δ) I, where P is the price (minus variable cost) of the service, r is the risk-adjusted discount 
rate, α is the economic depreciation rate, δ is the decreasing price of capital goods, and I is the cost 
of the investment. Intuitively, the price must exceed the cost of capital, which includes the change 
in the price of the capital good. After accounting for the option value, the entrant will invest 
whenever P > m (r + α + δ) I, where m is a term that accounts for the sunk cost nature of the 
investment coupled with inherent economic uncertainty relating to (1) demand uncertainty, (2) 
price uncertainty, (3) technological progress uncertainty, and (4) interest rate uncertainty. See Jerry 
Hausman, The Effect of Sunk Costs in Telecommunications Regulation, in REAL OPTIONS: THE NEW 
INVESTMENT THEORY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS 197-98 (James Alleman & 
Eli Noam eds., Kluwer 1999). 
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(1) the actual path of dynamically efficient access prices in future periods, (2) the 
regulator’s ability accurately to estimate and impose dynamically efficient access 
prices within its current policy framework, and (3) the probability of a change in 
policy framework that may cause the regulator to alter its approach altogether. 
For example, an incumbent administration might commit to phasing out the 
lower tiers of the investment ladder over a fixed time horizon, only to be reversed 
by a successor administration in a subsequent period that restores bitstream 
access at the original low prices. Uncertainty about each of these elements adds 
to the “regulatory risk” factor applied by both incumbents and entrants in 
evaluating potential investments. To avoid such uncertainty, regulators must 
make a “credible commitment” to raise prices and remove sharing requirements, 
because  
 
entrants must believe that mandated access will be temporary or that its 
price will rise if they are to factor this into their investment decisions. 
Otherwise ‘moral hazard’ problem will arise, with entrants knowing 
that, if they do not invest, the regulator will not remove their benefits.
 5
 
Expectations about future regulatory behavior are also critical with respect to 
decisions about whether to regulate new access technologies. For example, with 
advances in technology, incumbents seek to upgrade their broadband networks 
(both wireline and wireless) to support new services, including video. But 
incumbents fear the prospect that such investments could be appropriated by the 
regulator and shared with entrants.  
Recognizing this incentive problem, German regulators moved quickly to 
commit to not regulating fiber networks. In early 2005, German incumbent 
Deutsche Telekom (DT) asked regulators to forbear from unbundling regulations 
if it constructed a new fiber optic network. A DT spokesman noted at the time 
that the company “cannot possibly invest 3 billion euros in setting up a network 
without receiving adequate protection for [the] investment in return.”
6 In 
response, German lawmakers passed legislation granting DT sole use of its 
VDSL last-mile copper networks, which are used to connect to DT’s fiber-optic 
network.
7 This unique form of regulatory forbearance appears to have provided 
adequate regulatory certainty and incentive for DT to build the system as 
planned,
8 even in the face of the European Union’s decision to mount a court 
challenge to the German forbearance decision.
9 Nevertheless, the EU’s action 
 
5.   See Cave at 235. 
6.  As quoted in Tom Jowitt, Deutsche Telekom Fiber-Optic Monopoly Row Continues, 
COMPUTERWIRE, Feb. 22, 2006, available at http://www.computerwire.com/ 
industries/research/?pid=B8D172E2-34D2-4139-8284-F509C2E9A7DB. 
7.  Kevin J. O’Brien, German Parliament Approves Rules Banning Rivals from Deutsche 
Telekom’s New Network, INTERNATIONAL  HERALD  TRIBUNE, Dec. 15, 2006, available at 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/12/15/business/telekom.php (“The German Parliament voted 
Friday to ban rival telecommunications companies from selling services on Deutsche Telekom's 
new, super-high-speed broadband network, setting up a potentially embarrassing legal clash with 
European lawmakers.”). 
8. Deutsche  Telekom plans to connect 50 German cities with VDSL technology by 2008. 
Interim Group Report: January 1 to June 30, 2007, DEUTSCHE TELEKOM, AG, at 17 (“[DT] plans to 
equip 50 cities with VDSL and connect them to the platform by 2008.”). 
9. Eric  Pfanner,  EU Starts Court Case Against Germany Over Law Favoring Deutsche 
Telekom, INTERNATIONAL  HERALD  TRIBUNE, Feb 27, 2007, available at 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/02/27/business/telekom.php  (“European regulators have started 
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means that both the incumbent and its competitors face the prospect that 
Germany’s policies with respect to mandatory unbundling will be decided in a 
court of law, with both the outcome and its timing highly uncertain. As 
experience in the United States has shown, both incumbents and entrants have 
large stakes in the outcomes of such battles, and as a result are fully prepared to 
engage in both political lobbying and litigation to achieve their desired 
outcomes—with delay and uncertainty a seemingly inevitable consequence.
10
Similar situations can be found in many other countries. In Australia, the 
regulator’s inability credibly to commit to forbear from broadband unbundling 
requirements has delayed if not altogether scuttled a major nationwide broadband 
deployment plan. Telstra, the incumbent LEC, called off its previously planned 
fiber deployment after more than a year of negotiations with the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) finally announcing in 2006 
that “[o]ur fiber to the node (FTTN) project is on hold…[u]ntil our actual costs 
are recognized and the ACCC’s regulatory practices change, we will not invest in 
a FTTN broadband network.”
11 Although a consortium of competitors has 
threatened to step in with its own plan,
12 there has been no next generation 
broadband access deployment in Australia to match the deployment currently 
underway in the United States. 
In contrast to Australia’s ambivalent regulation or Germany’s forbearance, 
British fiber deployment has been hampered by uncertainty over the impact of 
unbundling requirements that are currently in effect. For example, British 
Telecom (BT) officer Matt Beal has said that current British unbundling 
regulations make fiber deployment “not worth the expense.”
13 BT chairman Sir 
Christopher Bland has also hinted that regulatory disincentives may play a role in 
Britain’s limited fiber deployment, noting that any fiber investment would need 
“to make sense for our shareholders if [BT is] going to invest lots of money in 
it.”
14 Because Ofcom, the British regulator, appears to be moving in the opposite 
 
legal proceedings against Germany over a new law that allows Deutsche Telekom to keep rivals off 
a high-speed network it is building to deliver on-demand movies and other services to German 
living rooms.”).  See also EU Takes Germany to Court over Telecom Law, INTERNATIONAL HERALD 
TRIBUNE,  June 27, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/27/ 
business/telekom.php. (“Deutsche Telekom aims to roll out a high-speed fiber-optic network that 
will transmit data up to 20 times faster than current offerings. The plan is to provide the 50 largest 
German cities with high-speed broadband lines by the end of 2007.”). 
10.  Such “rent-seeking activity” is an apparently unavoidable by product of government 
regulation and can lead to welfare losses well in excess of those traditionally associated with the 
“welfare loss triangle.” See, e.g., Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and 
Theft, WESTERN ECON. J. 224-232 (1967); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 
BELL J. ECON. MGMT. SCI. 3-21 (1971) (proving a theory of demand for and supply of regulation); 
Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 211-40 (1976) 
(formalizing Stigler’s model); Richard Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 
MGMT. SCI. 335-58 (1974).  
11.  Telstra Corp. Ltd., Annual Report 2006, Full Year Results and Operations Review, at 74, 
available at http://www.telstra.com.au/abouttelstra/investor/docs/fyresultsoverview.pdf. 
12. Renai  LeMay,  G9 Lodges Fiber Proposal with ACCC, ZDNET  AUSTRALIA, Apr. 20, 
2007,  available at http://www.zdnet.com.au/news/communications/soa/G9-lodges-fibre-proposal-
with-ACCC/0,130061791,339275000,00.htm.  
13. David  Meyer,  Fiber Access Essential Says Industry Group, ZDNET UK, Apr. 16, 2007, 
available at http://news.zdnet.co.uk/communications/0,1000000085,39286709,00.htm (“BT 
currently has no plans to upgrade the copper to high-speed fiber because it says regulation would 
force it to open those connections up to rival providers, thus making it not worth the expense.”) 
14. David  Meyer,  Outgoing BT Chief Hints at Fibre Rollout, ZD NET UK, July 19, 2007, 
available at http://news.zdnet.co.uk/communications/ 0,1000000085,39288121,00.htm.  
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direction, significant fiber optic system investment seems unlikely in the near 
future.
15  
The empirical literature on the investment effects of mandatory unbundling 
typically does not account explicitly for the role of such regulatory uncertainty, 
focusing instead on whether access rates are set at the efficient level at a point in 
time. Most such studies rely on cross-sectional or time-series data of a broad 
array of firms shortly after unbundling has been introduced. For example, Robert 
Crandall, Allan Ingraham, and Hal Singer used cross-state variation in the price 
of constructing local phone lines (adding capacity) relative to leasing unbundled 
loops (LLUs) to identify the sensitivity of CLEC investment in local lines to the 
LLU rate.
16 They showed that mandatory unbundling encourages a CLEC to 
delay facilities-based investment by altering its relative net present value of 
investment between time periods.
17 They also found that facilities-based lines 
growth relative to LLU growth was faster in states where regulated LLU rates 
were higher relative to the cost of facilities-based investment.
18  
Professor Leonard Waverman, Professor Meloria Meschi, Benoit Reillier, 
and Kalyan Dasgupta employed the Crandall-Ingraham-Singer methodology to 
examine the effect of unbundling requirements on infrastructure investment in 
Europe.
19 Using data from 2002-2006, the authors sought to determine the net 
effect that lower LLU prices—resulting from increased access regulation—had 
on broadband deployment, European economic output, and European 
employment.
20 They found that lower LLU rates steeply reduced the number of 
broadband consumers over that period.
21 Furthermore, using an approach 
developed by Crandall, Jackson, and Singer,
22 the authors suggest that lower 
LLU prices may, by reducing broadband investment over the next decade, forgo 
over 30 billion Euros of additional output and “thousands” of additional jobs.
23
Jerry Hausman and J. Gregory Sidak evaluated the investment effects of 
mandatory unbundling in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and 
Germany.
24 Their analysis demonstrated that, contrary to the prediction of the 
stepping stone hypothesis, U.S. competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) 
were increasingly relying on unbundling as their preferred mode of entry.
25 
 
15.  For example, Ofcom moved in 2004 to introduce copper and, possibly, fiber unbundling. 
See Graeme Wearden, Ofcom Forces Action on Broadband Unbundling, ZD NET UK, May 13, 
2004, available at http://news.zdnet.co.uk/communications/ 0,1000000085,39154558,00.htm. 
16.  Robert W. Crandall, Allan T. Ingraham & Hal J. Singer, Do Unbundling Policies 
Discourage CLEC Facilities-Based Investment? 4 TOPICS IN ECON. ANALYSIS 3 (2004). 
17.  Id. at 4-5. 
18.  Id. 
19. Leonard Waverman, Meloria Meschi, Benoit Reillier, & Kalyan Dasgupta, Access 
Regulation and Infrastructure Investment in the Telecommunications Sector: An Empirical 
Investigation, Working Paper, LECG Ltd. (Sept. 2007) [hereinafter European LLU Study]. 
20.  Id. at 2-3. 
21.  Id. at 3-4. 
22.  See Robert W. Crandall, Charles L. Jackson, and Hal J. Singer, The Effect of Ubiquitous 
Broadband Adoption on Investment, Jobs, and the U.S. Economy, Working Paper, Criterion 
Economics (Sept. 2003). 
23.  European LLU Study, supra note 19, at 5. 
24.  Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Did Mandatory Unbundling Achieve Its Purpose? 
Empirical Evidence from Five Countries, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 173 (2005).  
25.  Id. at 200-04. 
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Canadian CLECs also were shown to become increasingly dependent on 
unbundled loops for narrowband services between 1999 and 2002.
26 
Thomas W. Hazlett found that the pattern of CLEC entry in the United States 
suggests that competition achieved through mandatory unbundling does not lead 
to facilities-based entry.
27 Instead, rapid growth in the use of unbundled network 
facilities by CLECs quickly became the dominant form of CLEC entry.
28 Hazlett 
also found that capital expenditures in the network actually declined dramatically 
for both incumbents and entrants. He estimated that the simple correlation 
between unbundled network element (UNE) lines and non-cable facilities-based 
lines is roughly –1, indicating that UNE line growth crowded out new 
investments in the network.
29  
Most recently, Robert Crandall and J. Gregory Sidak analyzed quarterly data 
collected by the European Competitive Communications Association (ECTA).
30 
For each country in the ECTA database, they examined whether “higher-
investment” LLU lines overtake the sum of “lower-investment” bitstream and 
resale lines at some point in the sample period and, if not, whether LLU lines 
appear likely to overtake the sum of bitstream and resale lines in the near term. 
Crandall and Sidak found that LLU lines increased as a percentage of total CLEC 
lines between July 2002 and September 2006 in nine of the fifteen European 
countries in the sample. In the other six countries—Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, and the Netherlands—falling LLU lines as a percentage of total 
CLEC lines demonstrates that entrants did not move up the ladder of investment. 
According to Crandall and Sidak, the best support for the ladder-of-investment 
theory is to be found in France and Italy, two countries with little or no cable 
modem competition.  
The role of expectations is acknowledged, but not quantified, in a study by 
Larry Darby, Jeffrey Eisenach, and Joseph Kraemer, which analyzes the financial 
results of 24 publicly traded CLECs in the United States between 1996 and 2001. 
They found that industry expectations of favorable regulatory treatment (that is, 
long-term availability of below-cost pricing of network elements) contributed to 
excessive entry among CLECs, and ultimately to the “meltdown” that resulted in 
most CLECs going out of business or declaring bankruptcy.
31
The major contribution of this paper is that it examines in detail the 
investment reactions of incumbents and entrants over time to specific regulatory 
decisions regarding unbundling obligations. We consider two forms of regulatory 
forbearance: (1) the removal an unbundling obligation for an existing access 
technology (for example, a copper loop) or (2) forbearance from imposing an 
unbundling obligation for a new access technology (for example, a fiber loop). 
As we demonstrate below, the analysis of both types of investment decisions is 
very similar. 
 
26.  Id. at 232-33. 
27. Thomas W. Hazlett, Rivalrous Telecommunications Networks With and Without 
Mandatory Sharing, Working Paper, AEI-Brookings: Joint Center for Regulatory Studies 1 (May 
2005). 
28.  Id. at 11. 
29.  Id. at 21. 
30.  Robert W. Crandall & J. Gregory Sidak, Is Mandatory Unbundling the Key to Increasing 
Broadband Penetration in Mexico? A Survey of International Evidence, Working Paper, Criterion 
Economics (June 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=996065.  
31.  Larry F. Darby, Jeffrey A. Eisenach, & Joseph S. Kraemer, The CLEC Experiment: 
Anatomy of a Meltdown, Progress on Point 9.23, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Sept. 2002. 
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Figure 1 shows the optimal investment schedule for a hypothetical entrant 
whose expectations are based on a secure commitment by the regulator to slowly 
increase access prices over time such that by the date of forbearance, T1, the 
access price is equal to the voluntarily determined access rate. 
 
FIGURE 1: ENTRANT INVESTMENT SCHEDULE, 





The entrant’s investment schedule (on a per line basis) under the stepping stone 
hypothesis is the non-dashed line. T0 is the date on which the unbundling 
obligation is imposed and wholesale prices are set at long-run incremental cost. 
IMAX is the investment per line that would enable the entrant to completely bypass 
the incumbent’s network, and IMIN is the minimum investment per line to offer 
service at the lowest rung on the ladder. If the entrant is convinced that wholesale 
prices will increase over this period, and if the entrant is committed to serving as 
a facilities-based operator over the long term—two key assumptions underlying 
the stepping stone hypothesis—then the entrant should slowly increase its 
investment in its own facilities towards IMAX for two reasons. First, as the 
wholesale price increases, it is more profitable at the margin for the entrant to 
serve certain customers over its own facilities—that is, it is more profitable to 
move to a higher rung on the investment ladder over all or part of its network. 
Second, given the lag between investment and the ability to serve a customer 
over its own facilities, the entrant would prefer to be ready to serve 100 percent 
of its customers using its own facilities on T1.  
For the transition to facilities-based investment to occur, it is critical that the 
entrant believes that the regulator will not deviate from its commitment 
ultimately to raise access prices to the voluntary (i.e., market) access rate. 
Otherwise the entrant will withhold its investment until T1 to exploit fully the 
arbitrage opportunity made possible by the low wholesale rate. Such investment-
discouraging expectations can be formed during several scenarios. For example, 




T0  T1 
IMAX
IMIN
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unbundling experiment. Or the regulator could begin to increase wholesale rates, 
but then reverse itself, decreasing rates in midcourse. At the time of the reversal, 
the entrant would no longer find the regulator’s commitment to raise wholesale 
rates credible. Alternatively, even if the regulator is truly committed to increase 
wholesale rates and can calculate the actual going-forward costs of infrastructure, 
it may err in its calculation of the option value conferred on entrants. Any one of 
these errors would cause the entrants to remain on the bottom of the investment 
ladder, resulting in suboptimal investment relative to the welfare-maximizing 
path.  The regulator’s best choice in this circumstance is to accelerate the date of 
forbearance—that is, move T1 closer to T0. 
The previous discussion concerned the regulator’s decision to remove an 
unbundling obligation on an existing access technology. The regulator’s decision 
to forbear from regulating a new access technology has a similar effect on the 
investment schedule of the incumbent. It is a non-controversial proposition that 
unbundling has the effect of truncating the high end of the distribution of returns 
for incumbents, thereby decreasing their incentive to invest.
32 As was the case for 
the entrant, the regulator’s problem is exacerbated by its inability to commit to a 
particular policy in future periods. Figure 2 shows the incumbent’s investment 
schedule under two beliefs: (1) the regulator can be trusted to exclude new access 
technologies such as fiber from unbundling requirements at some future date and 
(2) the regulator cannot be trusted until it actually grants forbearance. 
 
FIGURE 2: INCUMBENT INVESTMENT SCHEDULE, 




At T0, the incumbent is investing at the maximum level, IMAX,B, to sustain the 
existing access technology. At some point after T0, the incumbent has the 
potential to invest in a new access technology, which requires investment IMAX,V.  
 
32.  The expected value of return on a new telecommunications service with mean µ and 
standard deviation σ when it is truncated at long run incremental cost c is E(y | y < c) = µ - σ M(c), 






T0  T1 
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Until the regulator can credibly commit to forbearing from applying 
unbundling requirement to the new access technology, however, the incumbent is 
reluctant to invest in those upgrades. Graphically, investment remains constant at 
IMAX,B between T0 and T1. Moreover, in contrast to the case of forbearing from 
regulating existing access technologies, the regulator does not have a simple way 
to signal its commitment to follow through on a promise of forbearance for a new 
access technology at some future date. Recall that the regulator could signal its 
commitment to forbear from regulating an existing access technology by slowly 
increasing the regulated wholesale price. Unfortunately, there is no similar policy 
instrument in the case of forbearing from regulating a new technology.
33
Assuming the regulator’s is unable to credibly signal its forbearance 
intentions, we would again expect investment to lag behind the economically 
optimal path during the period of uncertainty, and then to observe a discontinuity 
in incumbent investment around the time T1. In contrast, if the regulator can 
commit to forbearing from regulating the new access technology at some future 
date, then the incumbent will slowly increase its investment to IMAX,V, and the 
incumbent’s investment per line should increase gradually between T0 and T1.  
This hypothesis is the analog of the “stepping stone hypothesis” in the case of 
removing an unbundling obligation for an existing access technology. Thus, if 
the goal of the regulator is to achieve the economically efficient investment path, 
and if it cannot convince incumbents of its intention to shield new services from 
unbundling requirements at some point in the future, then the regulator should 
accelerate the date of forbearance—that is, move T1 closer to T0. 
Table 1 summarizes the results of this discussion. It bears emphasis that 
although the stepping stone hypothesis, as its name suggests, makes predictions 
about the behavior of entrants only, forbearance from regulating an existing 
access technology also affects an incumbent’s incentive to invest. Similarly, 
although the analog of the stepping stone hypothesis implicates the behavior of 
incumbents only, forbearance from regulating new services also affects an 
entrant’s incentive to invest.  
 
TABLE 1: PREDICTIONS OF STEPPING STONE HYPOTHESIS AND ITS ANALOG FOR 
NEW ACCESS TECHNOLOGIES 
  Forbear from Regulating an 
Existing Access Technology 
Forbear from Regulating a New 
Access Technology 
Entrant  Stepping Stone Prediction: No 
discontinuity in investment 
around the time of forbearance 
 
Incumbent    Regulator Can Be Trusted 
Prediction: No discontinuity in 
investment around the time of 
forbearance 
 
As Table 1 shows, the stepping stone hypothesis and its analog for incumbent 
investment in new services generate concrete predictions of the investment 
behavior of entrants and incumbents around the time of forbearance on existing 
and new services, respectively. In this paper, we test those predictions 
                                                      
33. The ultimate form of commitment, of course, is to issue a binding forbearance 
order, which precludes future unbundling for the new access technology. 
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empirically by examining the investment behavior of entrants and incumbents 
(collectively, “operators”) around the time of a forbearance order, and find 
significant discontinuities in investment.  It should be noted that our findings do 
not necessarily refute the stepping stone hypothesis as a matter or theory.  They 
do suggest, however, that in practice, regulators have not successfully met  the 
challenge of managing expectations described above.   Our paper is organized as 
follows. 
In Part II, we describe how we chose the cases studied. In Part III, we 
examine the deregulation of existing UNE service obligations in the Anchorage, 
Alaska area. In Part IV, we analyze the effect of regulatory forbearance on the 
deployment of U.S. fiber optic networks. Part V examines regulatory forbearance 
internationally, examining how regulatory forbearance affected the deployment 
of new 3G mobile telephony in Australia. Finally, Part VI offers policy 
implications from our findings. 
 
II. CASE STUDY SELECTION 
To select our case studies, we focused on significant decisions that would 
allow us to test the hypotheses presented in Table 1. In addition, selections were 
made so that we could examine ILEC and CLEC investment responses to 
forbearance decisions. Selections were also made to ensure that the review 
considered both cases that granted the removal of obligations on existing access 
technologies and cases that granted forbearance from the regulation of new 
access technologies. Finally, two of our three cases are drawn from the United 
States (the other is from Australia); this is in large part because the United States 
has a relatively lengthy and varied history of unbundling and forbearance, and 
thus offers a  variety of “natural experiments.” 
Our paper examines three specific regulatory events as case studies: (1) the 
FCC’s limited forbearance from regulation of the copper loop in the Anchorage, 
Alaska area (2) the series of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
decisions forbearing from the imposition of unbundling obligations on fiber optic 
networks in the United States; and (3) the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission’s decision to refrain from the “declaration” (imposition of 
unbundling requirements) of Third-Generation (3G) wireless networks in 
Australia. The first case examines forbearance from unbundling requirements on 
an  existing  access technology (the copper loop), whereas cases (2) and (3) 
address examples of forbearance from the imposition of unbundling requirements 
on new access technologies (fiber loop and wireless 3G). 
These cases, collectively, allow for an analysis of incumbent and entrant 
reactions to several watershed regulatory decisions. Each case had a large direct 
or indirect effect on investment calculations. Although this selection is by no 
means exhaustive, it touches on the crucial copper, fiber, and wireless 
components of modern telecommunications networks. 
 
III. FIRST CASE STUDY: FORBEARANCE FROM REGULATING EXISTING COPPER 
LOOPS IN ANCHORAGE, ALASKA 
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In September 2005, immediately following the FCC’s preliminary ruling 
granting Qwest regulatory forbearance in Omaha, Nebraska,
34 Alaska 
Communications Systems Group, Inc. (ACS) filed a similar petition for 
forbearance in Anchorage, Alaska.
35 Following Qwest’s example, ACS 
petitioned for forbearance from mandatory unbundling requirements to provide 
(existing) voice services in their Anchorage wire centers, which it contended 
were subject to fierce competition from the local cable operator. The 
Commission granted, in part, ACS’s petition in December 2006.
36
There are several reasons why ACS’s petition is an ideal opportunity to 
examine entrant and incumbent investment decisions in the face of regulatory 
forbearance. First, there was only one facilities-based competitive local exchange 
carrier, GCI, Inc. (GCI), operating in the Anchorage market. As a result, it was 
the only competitive local carrier directly affected by the FCC’s forbearance 
order. Second, ACS and GCI are both well-capitalized, profitable, facilities-
based carriers, ensuring that changes in investment decisions likely represent 
rational responses to changes in expected long-run rates of return (such as those 
caused by changes in the regulatory regime) than reactions to budget constraints 
associated (for example) with bankruptcy or cash-flow problems. Third, because 
ACS and GCI are both local Alaska companies with limited operations, 
Anchorage represents a substantial segment of their market, and thus also 
represents a substantial segment of their capital expenditures. Because of this 
limited scope of operations, we have greater confidence that changes in 
company-wide investment are caused by forbearance decisions in the Anchorage 
MSA.  
As noted above, the stepping stone hypothesis implies that investment should 
occur on a smooth path over the period of deregulation.  Thus, a smooth GCI 
investment schedule will provide some validation of the stepping stone 
hypothesis. Under the alternative hypothesis, one would expect to observe a 
discontinuity in GCI’s investment following regulatory forbearance. As such, 
discontinuity in GCI investment around the time of the Anchorage forbearance 
decision would provide some evidence that either (1) regulators were not 
successful in fully and accurately signaling their intentions with respect to the 
forbearance, or (2) that the deregulatory signal from the regulator was clear but 
GCI did not react according to the stepping stone theory, or some combination of 
the two.  
To test the hypothesis, we examined quarterly GCI line extension 
investments. Line extension investments account for the cost of extending last-
mile service to its customers. Because last-mile telecommunications service can 
also be provided over ACS’s unbundled UNE loops, line extension spending 
 
34.  In the Matter of Qwest Corporation Petition for Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 
§160(c) in the Omaha Metropolitan Statistical Area, FCC Memorandum and Order, WC Dkt. No. 
04-223 (rel. Dec. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Quest Petition]. 
35.  In the Matter of Petition of ACS of Anchorage, Inc. Pursuant to Section 10 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as Amended,  for Forbearance from Sections 251(c)(3) and 252(d)(1) 
in the Anchorage LEC Study Area,  Petition of ACS of Anchorage, Inc. for Forbearance from 
Sections 251(C)(3) and 252(D)(1), WC Dkt. No. 05-281 (filed Sept. 30, 2005) [hereinafter ACS 
Petition]. 
36.  In the Matter of Petition of ACS of Anchorage, Inc. Pursuant to Section 10 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as Amended,  for Forbearance from Sections 251(c)(3) and 252(d)(1) 
in the Anchorage LEC Study Area, FCC Memorandum and Order, WC Dkt. No. 05-281 (rel. Jan. 
30, 2007) [hereinafter Anchorage Memorandum and Order]. 
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represents direct substitution between these two alternatives. Examining line 
extension capital expenditures per access line in use, we observe a significant 
discontinuity in GCI’s line extension investment expenditures. This finding is 
consistent with the hypothesis that GCI did not find the regulator’s 
pronouncements of gradual de-regulation credible. Indeed, after initially 
increasing UNE loop rates in Anchorage from $14.92 to $19.15 in June 2004,
37 
the regulator decreased access price to $18.64 in November 2004.
38 The effect of 
this reversal in UNE rates may have undermined GCI’s belief that the regulator 
was committed to forbearing from regulation at some future date. 
A.  Mandatory Unbundling, Forbearance, and the 1996 Telecommunications Act 
The statutory obligation to for incumbents to unbundle network elements, 
and the regulator’s statutory authority to forbear from that requirement both 
reside in the 1996 Telecommunications Act.
39 The 1996 Act specifically imposes 
on each incumbent: 
 
The duty to provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier for the 
provision of a telecommunications service, nondiscriminatory access to network 
elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, 
and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory…An incumbent 
local exchange carrier shall provide such unbundled network elements in a 
manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements in order to 
provide such telecommunications service.
40
 
In addition, however, the 1996 Act gives the FCC the power to forbear from the 
unbundling regulations if such action is deemed by the Commission to be in the 
public interest. Specifically, the 1996 Act states: 
 
…the Commission shall forbear from applying any regulation or any provision 
of this chapter to a telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service, 
or class of telecommunications carriers or telecommunications services, in any 
or some of its or their geographic markets if the Commission determines that— 
… 
(3) forbearance from applying such provision or regulation is consistent 




37.  RCA Anchorage Decision, supra note 57, at 76. 
38.  In the Matter of the Petition by GCI Communications Corp. d/b/a General 
Communication, Inc., and d/b/a GCI for Arbitration under Section 252 of the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 with the Municipality of Anchorage d/b/a Anchorage Telephone Utility a/k/a ATU 
Telecommunications for the purpose of Instituting Local Exchange Competition, Order Approving 
Interconnection and Resale Agreement between ACS-AN and GCI, RCA Dkt. No. U-96-89, Order 
No. 51 (filed Dec. 7, 2004) at 76. Order came in response to arbitration. See In the Matter of the 
Petition by GCI Communications Corp. d/b/a General Communication, Inc., and d/b/a GCI for 
Arbitration under Section 252 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 with the Municipality of 
Anchorage d/b/a Anchorage Telephone Utility a/k/a ATU Telecommunications for the purpose of 
Instituting Local Exchange Competition, Joint Compliance Filing of ACS of Anchorage, Inc./GCI 
Interconnection Agreement Pursuant to Order No. 49, RCA Dkt. No. U-96-89 (filed Oct. 27, 
2004), at 23 Part C Attachment I. 
39.  Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 251. 
40.  S. 652, Telecommunications Act of 1996, 104
th Cong. I § 101(a) (1996); incorporated as 
47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3). 
41.  47 U.S.C. § 160(a). 
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The 1996 Act also instructed the Commission to “consider whether forbearance 
from enforcing the provision or regulation will promote competitive market 
conditions….”
42 The FCC’s decision to forbear from UNE regulation in 
Anchorage, as we discuss below, was predicated on the promotion of the public 
interest and on competition in local telephony. 
B.  ACS’s Petition for Forbearance 
At the time of its forbearance petition, the incumbent local exchange carrier, 
ACS, was required to provide entrants access to its network at regulated rates. Its 
sole facilities-based competitor, GCI, utilized ACS’ network (specifically, its 
last-mile loops) to serve a small portion of its customers, while serving the 
remainder of its customers entirely over its own facilities.   
GCI considers itself to be “the leading integrated, facilities-based 
communications provider in Alaska, offering local and long-distance voice, cable 
video, Internet and wireless communications services to consumer and 
commercial customers.”
43 Before ACS’s petition, GCI offered telephone service 
through either its own access lines or ACS access lines that were provided at a 
regulated rate, which at the time of ACS’s petition (September 2005) was $18.64 
per access line.
44 At that time, GCI relied on ACS’ UNEs to provide telephone 
service to approximately 7 percent of GCI’s total customers.
45  GCI had been 
successful in winning a growing proportion of market share.  In its petition, ACS 
claimed that, “ACS’s local exchange market share in Anchorage has fallen from 
nearly 100 percent to less than 50 percent.”
46  GCI was the only competitor in 
Anchorage that relied on UNE loops.
47  
C. GCI Repeatedly Indicated that Unbundling Requirements Decreased Its 
Incentive to Deploy Its Own Facilities 
GCI’s comments both before and during the forbearance proceeding indicate 
that its decisions to invest in its own loop and switching equipment were based in 
part on the regulatory environment.
48 In July 2004, for example, GCI Chief 
Financial Officer John Lowber stated, “[i]n part because we’re limited in our 
 
42.  47 U.S.C. § 160(b). 
43.  GCI, Inc, SEC FORM 10-K (filed Mar. 26, 2007) at 8. 
44.  In the Matter of Petition of ACS of Anchorage, Inc. Pursuant to Section 10 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as Amended,  for Forbearance from Sections 251(c)(3) and 252(d)(1) 
in the Anchorage LEC Study Area, Statement of David C. Blessing, WC Dkt. No. 05-281 (filed 
Sept. 30, 2005), at 3. 
45.  GCI, Inc., 2006 SEC FORM 10-Q (filed Nov. 14, 2006), at 26. 
46.  ACS Petition, supra note 35, at 1. 
47.  In the Matter of Petition of ACS of Anchorage, Inc. Pursuant to Section 10 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as Amended,  for Forbearance from Sections 251(c)(3) and 252(d)(1) 
in the Anchorage LEC Study Area, Statement of Thomas Meade, WC Dkt. No. 05-281 (filed Sept. 
30, 2005), at 3. (“GCI is the only CLEC that orders UNE loops from ACS.”) Although ACS faced 
additional competition from the local subsidiary of AT&T and from TelAlaska Id. at 2. These 
carriers relied on reselling ACS’ services. Id. at 3. (“By ACS’s estimates for June 2005, 
competitors in Anchorage provide service through the following means: approximately 11,000 lines 
are provisioned via resale under Section 251(c)(4)…”). 
48.  See, for example, In the Matter of Petition of ACS of Anchorage, Inc. Pursuant to Section 
10 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended,  for Forbearance from Sections 251(c)(3) and 
252(d)(1) in the Anchorage LEC Study Area, Opposition of General Communications, Inc., WC 
Dkt. No. 05-281 (filed Jan. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Statement of Thomas Meade], at 35-37. 
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ability to control loop rental costs, we’ve been positioning ourselves to deploy 
[digital local phone service] using our cable plant instead of leased local loops or 
other means involving the incumbent local exchange provider.”
49 However, GCI 
had also made clear that the extent and pace of last-mile line development hinged 
on “the opportunity costs of building its own last-mile facilities.”
50 In the 
following section, we review GCI’s comments before and after the FCC’s 
forbearance decision. 
1.  GCI Comments Before the FCC’s Forbearance Proceeding 
In its petition, ACS noted several examples where GCI appeared to signal 
that the extent and pace of last-mile development was dependent on the state of 
unbundling regulation. Predictably, GCI denied ACS’s interpretation of these 
statements.
51 GCI’s comments either addressed its last-mile facilities deployment 
incentives generally or its deployment of cable-based telephony products 
specifically. Taking these together, there appears to be ample evidence that the 
regulatory environment plays a crucial role in the rate and extent of last-mile 
facility construction.  
GCI’s comments before the Anchorage forbearance proceedings suggest that 
the price of regulated UNEs is an important consideration in its last-mile 
investment decisions. For example, GCI’s Senior Vice President for Regulatory 
Affairs, Dana Tindall, testified in an Alaskan state regulatory proceeding that 
“[r]aising prices dramatically would compel GCI to speed up the investment and 
deployment of its cable telephony network.”
52 Ms. Tindall also noted, in a 
separate statement, that “[i]f the UNE loop rate goes up GCI will speed up its 
cable telephony deployment.”
53 Although she noted that excessively high rates 
may force GCI from the marketplace, Ms. Tindall admitted that the price at 
 
49.  GCI Q2 2004 Earnings Call Transcript at 4 (July 28, 2004), as attached to ACS Petition, 
Exhibit F. 
  50.  See Statement of Thomas Meade, supra note 48, at 36 n. 148. See also Petition of GCI for 
Arbitration Under Section 252 of the Communications Act of 1996 with the Municipality of 
Anchorage a/k/a ATU Telecommunications for the Purpose of Instituting Local Exchange 
Competition, Testimony of Dana Tindall on Behalf of GCI, RCA Docket No. U-96-89, Public 
Hearing (Nov. 6, 2003), Volume X at 851 (“I’m not saying what we would do, but if it gets down 
to the rate where I believe a TELRIC rate makes a competitive entrance [sic] somewhat indifferent 
between building versus leasing we would have to look at it [continuing to build out GCI’s own 
facilities].”). See also Petition of GCI for Arbitration Under Section 252 of the Communications 
Act of 1996 with the Municipality of Anchorage a/k/a ATU Telecommunications for the Purpose of 
Instituting Local Exchange Competition, Prefiled Rebuttal Testimony of Dana Tindall on Behalf of 
General Communications, Inc. (GCI), RCA Docket No. U-96-89 (Sept. 29, 2003), at 3 (“It is clear 
at the outset of competition, if UNE rates are set too high, they will act as a barrier to entry, and if 
they are set too low, they run the risk of discouraging new technologies.”). 
51.  Id. at 35-37. 
52.  In the Matter of Petition by GCI Communications Carp. d/b/a General Communication 
Inc. and GCI, for Arbitration Under Section 252 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 with the 
Municipality of Anchorage d/b/a ATU Telecommunications a/k/a ATU Telecommunications for the 
Purpose of Instituting Local Competition, Prefiled Rebuttal Testimony of Dana Tindall on Behalf of 
General Communication, Inc., RCA Docket No. U-96-89 (filed Sept. 29, 2003), at 3. 
53. TESTIMONY OF DANA  TINDALL ON BEHALF OF GCI,  BEFORE THE REGULATORY 
COMMISSION OF ALASKA, Public Hearing (Nov. 6, 2003), Volume X at 850 (cited and included in In 
the Matter of Review of the Commission’s Rules Regarding the Pricing of Unbundled Network 
Elements and the Resale of Service by Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Comments of ACS, WC 
Docket No. 03-173 (filed Dec. 16,2003), Exhibit L, at 842.) 
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which GCI would increase its cable telephony investments was above the 
existing regulated UNE price.
54
Subsequent GCI statements similarly suggest that cable-based telephony 
investments may have been suppressed as a result of low UNE prices. For 
example, a senior GCI official noted that “[o]riginally we had a thought that 
DLPS [i.e., cable telephony] would [be] built out through the entirety of our 
footprint over a five-year base.”
55 However, in response to questions from an 
investment analyst regarding GCI’s potential response to a UNE rate increase,
56 
the GCI official noted that “in light of the [Regulatory Commission of Alaska’s] 
generous decision, we have a very significant incentive to [move faster with 
DLPS deployment].”
57 As a result, the GCI official suggested that “the question 
we’re grappling with is could we shrink that to something like a three-year 
timeframe for full DLPS deployment.”
58  
Evidently, GCI was able to increase its investment in last-mile facilities, but 
would do so only in response to an increase in the rate paid for UNE access. The 
previous GCI comments, culled from 2004 Alaskan state regulatory proceedings, 
only set the stage for the FCC’s review of the Anchorage UNE regulations. The 
FCC’s decision to forbear from UNE regulation altogether in some Anchorage 
wire centers proved to be a far greater incentive to GCI’s deployment of its own 
last-mile telecommunications facilities than modest UNE rate increases. 
2.  GCI Comments Following the FCC Decision 
GCI’s pronouncements following the Anchorage forbearance decision also 
suggested that UNE regulation may have impeded infrastructure investments. 
Issuing a statement the day after the formal announcement of the FCC’s 
Anchorage decision, GCI suggested that rate increases would affect last-mile 
investment. It stated, in part, that “[t]he rate increase reinforces GCI’s 
determination to finish converting the customers it serves in Anchorage using 
ACS unbundled loops to GCI’s own facilities.”
59  
 
54.  Id. at 843. In response to the question “…when you use the word dramatically what 
number were you thinking about?”, Ms. Tindall replied that “I don’t have any numbers and 
probably for FCC reasons I can’t give you any numbers today, but I’m telling you that there is a 
range of numbers in between the current UNE price and the [higher] 28 dollar price where those 
different effects [e.g. increased investment or market exit] may occur.” 
55. GCI INC., Q2 2004 Earnings Call Transcript, July 28, 2004, at 11, as attached to ACS 
Petition, supra note 35, at Exhibit F. 
56.  Id. at 11. Specifically, Anthony Klarman of Deutsche Bank asked: “Will you be adding 
infrastructure to accelerate [DLPS deployment] against the backdrop of obviously [sic] the 
[Regulatory Commission of Alaska’s] agreement to raise the UNE rates?” 
57.  Id. By “generous” he appears to be considering the decision generous to ACS, which was 
granted a significant rate increase (from $14.92 to $19.15). See In the Matter of the Petition by GCI 
Communications Corp. d/b/a General Communication, Inc., and d/b/a GCI for Arbitration under 
Section 252 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 with the Municipality of Anchorage d/b/a 
Anchorage Telephone Utility a/k/a ATU Telecommunications for the purpose of Instituting Local 
Exchange Competition, Order Setting Prices for Access to Unbundled Network Elements, Resale 
and Terms and Conditions of Interconnection, RCA Dkt. No. U-96-89, Order No. 42 (filed June 25, 
2004) at 76. [hereinafter RCA Anchorage Decision] (“This order sets interconnection rates for GCI 
to pay ACS-AN in the Anchorage market. We find that $19.15 is a fair loop rate.”) 
58.  Id.  
59. GCI,  Inc.,  GCI Comments on FCC’s Anchorage Forbearance Decision, Press Release, 
December 29, 2006, as attached to GCI Inc., SEC FORM 8-K (filed Dec. 29, 2006), at Exhibit 99.1. 
This statement came one day after the FCC’s press release, F.C.C., FCC Grants ACS of Anchorage, 
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D. GCI Significantly Increased Investment Following the Anchorage UNE 
Forbearance Decision 
GCI’s financial reports confirm that the company’s investment responded 
directly and significantly to the FCC’s forbearance decision.  As Figure 3 
indicates, GCI’s quarterly line extension expenditures per access line ranged 
between $0.41 and $11.79 for the period preceding the initiation of the 
Anchorage forbearance case. By comparison, GCI invested—per current access 
line—$71.61, $102.64, $82.77, and $82.62 on line extensions in the four quarters 
(Quarter 3, 2006 to Quarter 2, 2007) following the FCC’s decision to grant 
forbearance. GCI’s investment is plotted against the UNE access rate in 
Anchorage. 
 
FIGURE 3: GCI LINE EXTENSION INVESTMENT PER LINE AND THE UNE 
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8/25/06: FCC provisionally 
accepts forbearance
9/30/05: ACS files FCC 
forbearance petition






3/15/07: GCI and ACS 
agree to new rate terms
 
Sources: GCI Inc. SEC filings, RCA Dkt. No. U-96-89 Orders.  
Note: Capital expenditures are in nominal terms. 
 
The large discontinuity in CLEC investment appears is consistent with the 
hypothesis that regulators were unsuccessful in signaling accurately and credibly 
their intentions with respect to forbearance until very close to the time of the 
actual decision. The stable, low level of line extension investment preceding 
ACS’s petition for forbearance suggests that GCI’s regulated access to ACS’s 
copper loops provided little incentive to invest in its own facilities, and also that 
GCI did not anticipate an unfavorable regulatory change that would affect its 
                                                                                                                                    
Inc. Forbearance Relief in the Anchorage, Alaska Study Area, Press Release, Dec. 28, 2007, 
available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-269254A1.pdf. 
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access to ACS loops. Once the FCC’s intentions became clear, however, GCI  
substantially increased its investment in last-mile facilities. 
It is also worthy of note that a previous increase in the regulated cost of ACS 
unbundled loops, which GCI might have taken as a signal of regulatory intent to 
follow-through on the stepping stone model, does not appear to have had a 
signficant effect on GCI’s last-mile investment as the FCC’s forbearance 
decision. In June 2004, the Regulatory Commission of Alaska (RCA) issued an 
arbitration order increasing the unbundled loop rate from $14.92
60 to $19.15.
61 
Although GCI last-mile investment (line extension investment rose following the 
decision, from $0.95 to $3.33 per line per quarter), the effect is trivial in 
comparison to the increase seen after the FCC’s forbearance decision.
62
Our examination of the Anchorage forbearance decision provides support for 
the hypothesis that regulators have difficulty accurately signaling their intentions 
with  respect to forbearance, suggests that the result of such signaling failures is 
to reduce facilities-based investment (and thus facilities-based competition) 
below what it would otherwise be, and shows that the impact on investment can 
be quickly reversed once forbearance is announced. Regulatory forbearance 
appears to have provided GCI with a strong incentive to accelerate facilities-
based investment.  
 
IV. SECOND CASE STUDY:  FORBEARANCE FROM REGULATING NEW FIBER 
NETWORKS IN THE UNITED STATES 
In addition to forbearing from regulation of existing services, the FCC also 
has, and has exercised, authority to refrain from regulating new or emerging 
services, particularly services that are deemed to have high risk and large 
potential rewards. The combination of high costs and high uncertainty regarding 
the potential size and value of the market make investments in new services and 
new technologies especially risky. Regulatory uncertainty only adds to the risk 
that potential investors must bear. Regulatory risk can result in suboptimal 
investment in new services.  
This section examines how regulatory forbearance has affected U.S. 
incumbent LEC investment in broadband infrastructure. We find that initial 
regulatory uncertainty dampened incumbent investment incentives in much the 
same way that existing UNE regulation dampened CLEC investment incentives. 
We also find substantial evidence that incumbents withheld investment until a 
series of FCC decisions granted forbearance from unbundled access requirements 
for fiber-to-the-home (FTTH), fiber-to-the-curb (FTTC), and other “greenfield” 
fiber lines. Following regulatory forbearance, we observe a sharp increase in 
incumbent broadband deployment. 
A.  Background of Fiber and DSL Regulation in the United States 
 
60.  See GCI Communications Corp. d/b/a GCI, GCI Files for Lower UNE Rates, Press 
Release, Nov. 21, 2002, available at http://www.gci.com/about/press/acs_rates.htm.  
61.  RCA Anchorage Decision, supra note 57, at 76. 
62.  One implication of this finding is that the bifurcation of regulatory authority, in this case 
between the state regulator (responsible for setting access rates) and the FCC (responsible for 
declaring forbearance) may inhibit the ability of regulators to credibly signal their intentions.  Such 
bifurcation is not unusual.  For example, both the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission and its Department of Department of Communications, Information Technology, and 
the Arts have authority to forbear from imposing unbundling requirements. 
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Before the FCC’s fiber forbearance decisions, it was presumed that fiber 
optic systems would be subject to the existing mandatory unbundling 
requirements on copper wire. In particular, the limited fiber regulation provided 
by the FCC’s First Report and Order suggested that any fiber optic system 
would be subject to unbundling requirements.
63 The continued failure of the 
Triennial Review in the U.S. court system, however, allowed the Commission to 
amend its initial determinations to include fiber optic forbearance. Regulatory 
forbearance for consumer fiber optic loops was upheld in subsequent court action 
and clarified and expanded by subsequent Commission action.  
1.   The FCC’s Report and Order and Order on Remand 
Following passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
64 the FCC 
attempted to enumerate the services that would be subjected to the new 
unbundled access requirements. The Commission primarily focused on copper 
loop telephone lines, switching, and transport services, as these services formed 
the backbone of the existing telecommunications infrastructure. Fiber optic and 
DSL technologies, which were considered new technologies, were not subject to 
extensive unbundled access requirements. At the time of the First Report and 
Order, fiber optic technology was used primarily by the carriers to connect their 
wire centers together, rather than for last-mile access. As such, the Commission 
provided unbundled access to incumbents’ optical transmission equipment while 
remaining silent on as-yet-undeveloped consumer fiber access.
65 The 
Commission did, however, leave the door open to future high-speed consumer 
fiber regulation, a development opposed by incumbents. As the Commission 
noted in the First Report and Order’s discussion, incumbents protested UNE 
regulation (including regulation for fiber optic systems) on the grounds that it 
would create a disincentive to invest in new facilities.
66
The FCC took gradual steps to clarify how it would regulate what it called 
“next-generation networks,” including DSL and fiber optic connections. In 2003, 
 
63.  See, for example, In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Interconnection between Local Exchange Carriers and 
Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, First Report and Order, CC Dkt. Nos. 96-98, 95-
185, at 215 para. 450 [hereinafter First Report and Order]. (“PacTel argues that local loops may be 
made of copper or fiber optics, or they may be digital or analog, and thus, the Commission cannot 
determine the elements that should be unbundled without dictating network technologies…our 
rules will provide new entrants with the opportunity to obtain access to a number of different 
variants of a particular element…”). The Commission is silent regarding exactly which loop 
technologies are subject to unbundling requirements, and whether fiber optic systems in particular 
are included. 
64. S. 652, Telecommunications Act of 1996, 104th Cong. (1996) (enacted); became 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56-161 (1996). 
65.  First Report and Order, supra note 63, at 211 para. 440. (“The incumbent LEC must also 
provide, to the extend discussed below, all technically feasible transmission capabilities, such as 
DS1, DS3, and Optical Carrier levels that the competing provider could use to provide 
telecommunications services…In general, this means that incumbent LECs must provide interoffice 
facilities between wire centers owned by incumbent LECs or requesting carriers.”) 
66.  See id. at 310-11 para. 638. (“…incumbent LECs argue that setting prices based on the 
forward-looking economic cost of the element will not create incentives for new entrants to build 
their own facilities, and will discourage efficient entry and useful investment by both incumbent 
LECs and their competitors.”) Note that although this discussion focuses on UNE regulation 
generally, the arguments apply to fiber optic systems as well. 
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Although we require the unbundling of legacy technology used over hybrid 
loops, we decline to attach unbundling requirements to the next-generation 
network capabilities of fiber-based local loops…. We expect that this decision to 
refrain from unbundling incumbent LEC next-generation networks…will 
stimulate facilities-based deployment in two ways. First, with the certainty that 
their fiber optic and packet-based networks will remain free of unbundling 
requirements, incumbent LECs will have the opportunity to expand their 
deployment of these networks.
68
 
Regarding competition, the Commission declared that “relieving incumbent 
LECs from unbundling requirements for these networks will promote investment 
in, and deployment of, next-generation networks.”
69 The FCC also expected that 
forbearance would increase CLEC investment. The Report and Order and Order 
on Remand stated that “with the knowledge that incumbent LEC next-generation 
networks will not be available on an unbundled basis, competitive LECs will 
need to continue to seek innovative network access options to serve end users 
and to fully compete.”
70 In short, this judgment was intended to spur competition 
and investment in the provision of fiber optic telecommunications. 
2.   USTA II and the FCC’s Order on Remand 
Following the extension of forbearance to fiber optic facilities in the Report 
and Order and Order on Remand, a series of legal challenges forced the 
Commission to explicitly define the extent of its forbearance. Within 10 days of 
the release of the Report and Order and Order on Remand, no fewer than 13 
parties—including incumbent LECs, competitive LECs, industry groups, and 
consumer advocates—had filed petitions for review before the courts.
71 These 
petitions were consolidated in U.S. Telecom Association v. FCC.
72 Following the 
D.C. Circuit’s ruling in favor of forbearance from fiber unbundling, the FCC 
 
67.  In the Matter of Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local 
Exchange Carriers, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability, Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, CC Dkt. Nos. 01-338, 96-98, and 98-147, 18 FCC Rcd 16978 (Aug. 23, 
2003) [hereinafter Report and Order and Order on Remand]. 
68.  Id. at 17141 para. 272. 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. at 17141 para. 272. 
71.  As noted in the National Association of State Utility Consumers Advocates (NASUCA) 
petition. See Reply Brief of Petitioner at ii., U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. F.C.C., 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (No. 00-1012) (lead case), Nat’l Ass’n of State Utility Consumer Advocates (No. 03-1442). 
(“Petitions for review of the Triennial Review Order were filed by 13 parties in 11 circuit courts 
within 10 days of publication of the Triennial Review Order.”) 
72.  U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. F.C.C., 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004) [hereinafter USTA II]. 
Referring to consolidation, id., at ii (“On September 30, 2003, the Eighth Circuit issued an order 
transferring the consolidated cases to the U.S. Court of Appeal for the D.C. Circuit. The lead 
petition was filed by United States Telecom Association and re-docketed as Case No. 03-1310.”). 
This consolidated incumbent LEC petitions (Verizon, case no. 03-1311; Quest, 03-1312; and 
AT&T Corp., 03-1331) and competitive LEC petitions (of the many, note especially WorldCom 
Inc., 03-1319; TDS Metrocom, 03-1325; McLeodUSA Telecommunications, 03-1329; and Covad 
Comm. Company, 03-1360). 
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expanded and qualified its forbearance in its Order on Remand (not to be 
confused with the prior Report and Order and Order on Remand). Finally, the 
D.C. Circuit Court, in Covad Communications Co. v. F.C.C.,
73 upheld the FCC’s 
revised judgments in the Triennial Review. These steps, together, helped to 
strengthen and extend unbundling access forbearance to a variety of fiber-based 
telecommunications facilities. 
Forbearance from fiber optic access unbundling survived judicial review in 
USTA II. Although the D.C. Circuit Court reversed and remanded much of the 
FCC’s Report and Order and Order on Remand in USTA II, the court did find 
sufficient evidence to uphold forbearance from unbundling requirements for fiber 
optic systems. Because the FCC had focused on fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) 
deployment in particular, the D.C. Circuit Court paid specific attention to FTTH. 
To justify its decision in favor of the FCC’s FTTH forbearance, the court cited 
the limited extent of current incumbent build-out, the high costs and potential 
benefits of fiber deployment, and similar incumbent and CLEC barriers to 
entry.
74 The court also noted that “[a]n unbundling requirement under these 
circumstances seems likely to delay infrastructure investment, with CLECs 
tempted to wait for ILECs to deploy FTTH and ILECs fearful that CLEC access 
would undermine the investments’ potential return.”
75 In this sense, the D.C. 
Circuit agreed that forbearance from unbundled fiber access would be a 
necessary and equitable solution to ensure incumbent and CLEC investment. 
In late 2004, the FCC expanded its fiber forbearance to include all manner of 
“high capacity” loops, including DS-1 and DS-3 high capacity fiber loops. In its 
Order on Remand, the FCC stipulated a general policy of forbearance from 
unbundling regulation for high-capacity loops located in wire centers that serve 
more than a given threshold of business customers. Finding evidence that higher-
capacity loops enjoyed commensurately greater revenue opportunities, the 
Commission set the relevant threshold for DS-3 loops at 38,000, whereas DS-1 
loops were considered “impaired” if there were less than 60,000 business loops 
in a given wire center.
76 In addition, the Commission did not find grounds for any 
unbundling on the provision of access to “dark fiber,” fiber optic facilities that 
are not in operation at a given time.
77 Subsequent FCC proceedings have 
extended and clarified these provisions to include FTTH and fiber-to-the-curb 
(FTTC) forbearance on a nationwide basis.
78
 
73.  Covad Comm. Co. v. F.C.C., 450 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2006) [hereinafter Covad]. 
74.  U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. F.C.C., supra note 72, at 584. 
75.  Id. at 584. 
76.  In the Matter of Unbundled Access to Network Elements, Review of the Section 251 
Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Order on Remand, WC Dkt. No. 
04-313, CC Dkt. No. 01-338, (rel. Feb. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Order on Remand], at 5. 
(“Competitive LECs are impaired without access to DS3-capacity loops except in any building 
within the service area of a wire center containing 38,000 or more business lines and 4 or more 
fiber-based collocators. Competitive LECs are impaired without access to DS1-capacity loops 
except in any building within the service area of a wire center containing 60,000 or more business 
lines and 4 or more fiber-based collocators.”)
77.  Id. at 5. (“Competitive LECs are not impaired without access to dark fiber loops in any 
instance.”)
78.  See In the Matters of Petition for Forbearance of the Verizon Telephone Companies 
Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c), SBC Communications Inc.’s Petition for Forbearance Under 47 
U.S.C. § 160(c), Qwest Comm. Int’l Inc. Petition for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c), 
BellSouth Telecommunications Inc. Petition for Forbearance under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c), 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, WC Dkt. Nos. 01-338, 03-235, 03-260, 04-48, 19 FCC Rcd. 
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Now on its fourth attempt, the Commission’s Order on Remand provisions 
were accepted by the D.C. Circuit Court in Covad. Noting that “[b]ecause we 
conclude that the Commission’s fourth try is a charm,” the D.C. Circuit Court 
denied all challenges to the Commission’s latest attempt to clarify the scope of its 
unbundling rules.
79 As a result, the more extensive forbearance laid out in the 
Order on Remand and subsequent FTTC decisions have been adopted, allowing 
certainty of regulatory forbearance for many DS-1 and DS-3 high-capacity loops. 
B.  Unbundling Deregulation Spurred Investment 
As shown in Figure 4, aggregate data on investment in communications 
equipment in the United States strongly suggest a connection between the timing 
of the FCC’s broadband forbearance decisions.  
 














FCC Exempts DSL 
from UNE












Source: U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis. Capital 
expenditures are in real terms. 
 
As the figure shows, passage of the Telecommunications Act led to strong initial 
increases in communications equipment investments, followed by a sharp 
downturn in 2001-2002, corresponding to the bursting of the “telecom bubble” 
and the collapse of CLEC investment.
80 Only in 2003, coincident with the 
                                                                                                                                    
21496 (rel. Oct. 27, 2004) [hereinafter October 2004 Fiber Decision]; see also In the Matter of 
Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, 
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability,  Order on 
Reconsideration, CC Dkt. Nos. 01-338, 96-98, 98-147, 19 FCC Rcd 20293 (rel. Oct. 18, 2004) 
[hereinafter FTTC Decision]. 
79.  Covad Comm. Co. v. F.C.C., supra note 73, at 530. 
80.  See, for example, Simon Romero, Telecommunications Outlook: First the Bad News, 
then the Bad News, N.Y.  TIMES, June 18, 2002, available at 
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beginning of the FCC’s increasing reliance on regulatory forbearance, did 
investment recover, rising by more than 40 percent over the next three years. To 
be fair, it is possible that the investment trend depicted in Figure 4 was affected 
by factors unrelated to the FCC’s regulatory decisions, including the business 
cycle. We have not attempted to control for those factors here. 
The apparent connection between regulation and investment is confirmed by 
a more granular examination of capital expenditures by incumbent wireline 
companies for the years 2002 to 2007. We examined capital expenditure and 
access line information for AT&T Inc., BellSouth, SBC, and Verizon.
81 Due to 
accounting irregularities, near bankruptcy, and the withdrawal of some necessary 
SEC filings, Qwest was not included in this study of incumbent LEC investment.  
As displayed in Figure 5 below, U.S. incumbent LEC wireline capital 
expenditures remained essentially flat from 2002 to late 2004, but have trended 
upward since late 2004. Before the FCC’s nation-wide fiber forbearance decision 
in October of 2004, industry-wide capital expenditures were reasonably stable 
around an average of $35 per line per quarter. Following that decision, industry-
wide capital expenditures trended upward, with a simple average over the latter 
period of $45 per line per quarter. This upward trend appears to have been 
consolidated and extended by the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision to uphold, on the 
fourth attempt, the FCC’s proposed rules in the Triennial Review. Figure 5, 
which registers a sharp increase in per-line capital expenditures following 




c=technology&spon=&pagewanted=1 (“News over the weekend that Joseph P. Nacchio was 
leaving the beleaguered telecommunications company Qwest Communications International and 
that the fiber optic carrier XO Communications would file for bankruptcy protection came in the 
wake of more bad news from two more established players…This confluence of negative news, 
combined with the languishing bankruptcy proceedings of Global Crossing.”). 
81.  As a result of industry consolidation, AT&T Corp., SBC, and BellSouth have merged to 
form AT&T Inc. Because these changes made it impossible to disentangle the contribution that 
AT&T Corp.’s long distance services have on AT&T Inc. capital expenditures, we included AT&T 
Corp.’s capital expenditures from past years as well. In this way it was hoped that long-distance 
capital expenditures would contribute a roughly equal share to industry capital expenditure across 
all years, rather than providing a spurious increase in industry capital expenditures as a result of the 
AT&T/SBC merger. 
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FIGURE 5: U.S. INCUMBENT WIRELINE CAPITAL  
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Source: AT&T Corp., AT&T Inc., BellSouth, SBC, and Verizon SEC filings. 
Note: Capital expenditures are in nominal terms. 
 
Individual company statements support the view that FCC forbearance has 
directly led to increases in next generation network investments. For example, 
SBC CEO Ed Whitacre suggested in June 2004 that, given a friendly regulatory 
environment, SBC would invest up to $6 billion in fiber-based infrastructure 
upgrades.
82 Following the FCC’s fiber and FTTC forbearance decisions in 
October 2004,
83 SBC announced that it would “dramatically accelerate” its fiber 
deployment as a result of the FCC’s action. As a result, its plan to deploy fiber to 
18 million homes was expected to take roughly three years, rather than the five 
years originally envisioned.
84 Similarly, Verizon developed ambitious fiber 
deployment plans in the midst of the 2004 changes, committing to spend $2.4 
billion between mid-2004 and the end of 2005 to deploy its FiOS fiber optic 
                                                      
82.  SBC’s Whitacre Promises Big Investment – With a Catch, TELECOM POLICY REPORT, July 
11, 2004, retrieved Aug. 22, 2007, available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PJR/is_26_2/ai_n6098380. (“Ed Whitacre, the charismatic 
chairman and CEO of SBC Communications, on June 22 told attendees at Supercomm 2004 that if 
the FCC crafts the right regulations, his company will invest up to $6 billion in upgrades to the 
company's telecom infrastructure.”) 
83. Specifically,  see October 2004 Fiber Decision, supra note 78, and FTTC Decision, supra 
note 78. 
84.  FCC Relieves Bells From Requirement to Unbundle FTTC Loops, TELECOM A.M., Oct. 
15, 2004. (“SBC said the [new FCC] rules would "dramatically accelerate" its fiber deployment, 
providing advanced broadband services to 18 million homes in 2-3 years, rather than 5 years as 
previously announced.”) 
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system.
85 BellSouth also indicated in 2005 that it had extensively increased its 
deployment of fiber-to-the-curb since the FCC’s Order on Reconsideration 
(granting FTTC forbearance) in 2004, and that favorable news upholding the 
FTTC decision would allow it to continue its acceleration of FTTC coverage.
86
Recall that the incumbent analog to the stepping stone hypothesis posits that 
pre-forbearance investment will gradually increase up to the point of forbearance, 
while the alternative thesis that regulators cannot accurately signal their 
intentions suggests a discontinuity in investment around the time of the 
forbearance decision.  Our examination of incumbent LEC investment from 
2002-2004 supports the latter hypothesis. Figure 5 shows that incumbent 
investment levels over the period 2002-2004 appeared to trend downward, with 
each trough deeper than the preceding one, while investment turned upward 
sharply at about the time forbearance was announced.  Taken in conjunction with 
the contemporaneous statements of the companies themselves, the U.S. 
experience with fiber tends to support the hypothesis that regulatory uncertainty 
leads to suboptimal investment while certainty, in the form of a court-validated 
forbearance order, can quickly reverse the effect. 
 
V. THIRD CASE STUDY: FORBEARANCE FROM REGULATING NEW WIRELESS 
NETWORKS IN AUSTRALIA 
Although our previous cases occurred in the United States, regulatory 
forbearance has also been employed internationally. For example, the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has favored forbearance from 
mobile telephone regulation. In December 2004 the ACCC granted forbearance 
for domestic mobile roaming services. In September 2005, the ACCC adopted a 
similar decision involving international mobile roaming services. Most recently, 
although not a formal process like the former cases, the ACCC indicated in 
October 2006 that it would forbear, for the time being, from access regulations 
on Telstra’s Third Generation GSM (3G) network.  
The unique structure of Australian telecommunications regulation, which 
does not provide for the same level of regulatory certainty as in the United States, 
puts special emphasis on the cumulative nature of the ACCC’s forbearance. 
Under the Australian regulatory system, services that are subject to rate or 
unbundled access regulation are “declared” as services by the Commission; thus, 
a decision not to declare a service is akin to regulatory forbearance in the 
American system. For each forbearance decision (domestic mobile roaming, 
international mobile roaming, and 3G regulation), the ACCC specifically 
declined to “declare” the respective service.  
This process does not, however, preclude the Commission from declaring a 
service at a future time. For example, after declining to declare a domestic 
 
85. Telecom: The Fiber-Optic Quagmire, BUSINESS  WEEK, Dec. 6, 2004, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_49/b3911038_mz011.htm. [hereinafter 
Business Week FiOS Report] (“Verizon Communications Inc. has an even more technologically 
ambitious goal: spending $2.4 billion by the end of 2005 to provide video and other services to 
some 3 million homes.”) 
86. Dan  O’Shea,  BellSouth: More Fiber in 2005, TELEPHONY ONLINE, Jul. 1, 2005, available 
at http://telephonyonline.com/fttp/technology/bellsouth_fiber_070105/. (“BellSouth released a 
statement this week telling the Federal Communications Commission that it plans to deploy fiber to 
almost 60% more locations in 2005 than it did in 2004. The statement was a response to CLECs' 
attempts to have the FCC's fiber-to-the-curb ruling from last year re-written, the company said.”) 
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mobile roaming service, the Commission acknowledged that it “intends to 
monitor the terms and conditions of supply of domestic roaming on CDMA 
networks over the next 12-24 months and will re-examine the case for declaration 
if the information it receives suggests that those terms and conditions are 
unreasonable.”
87  
Australian regulators have acknowledged the important role that facilities-
based competition plays in their regulatory decisions. For example, in May 2005 
ACCC Commissioner Edward Willett noted: 
 
ULLS and LSS are unlikely to thrive unless wholesale ADSL and fixed 
line resale provides an effective stepping stone for greater infrastructure 
competition. Getting the pricing of these services right is therefore the 
essential first step to the removal of regulation from most areas.
88
 
Importantly, Commissioner Willett’s explicit discussion of ADSL broadband 
pricing as a “stepping stone” suggests that the ACCC has predicated its approach 
at least in part on the stepping stone model.
89 Commissioner Willett has also 
endorsed the idea that resale pricing regulation represents a “first step” toward 
deregulation.
90 Further endorsing a regulatory approach akin to the stepping stone 
hypothesis, Commissioner Willett noted that “infrastructure based competition 
seems to provide more rapid and sustainable development [than service based 
competition].”
91 Finally, he argues that the Commission has regulated to 
encourage facilities-based competition since the current regulatory regime began 
in 1997.
92 Thus, the underlying basis for the Australian approach to unbundling 
and forbearance appear to be similar – even if, as noted above – the resulting 
policies have been (?) different in important respects (e.g., Australia’s refusal, to 
date, to forbear from unbundling new investments in fiber). 
 
In this section, we review the ACCC’s mobile telephony forbearance cases 
and examine the impact they have had on capital expenditures by Australia’s 
incumbent carrier, Telstra. We find evidence to suggest that the cumulative effect 
of several regulatory forbearance measures convinced Telstra that an investment 
in 3G technology would not be subject to regulation, and thereby induced Telstra 
to increase its capital expenditures on 3G mobile technology. 
A.  ACCC Forbearance from Australian Domestic Mobile Roaming Declaration 
 
87.  Mobile Services Review, Mobile Domestic Inter-Carrier Roaming Service, Final Report 
on Whether or Not the Commission Should Declare a Mobile Domestic Inter-carrier Service, 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Dec. 2004 [hereinafter ACCC Final Report], 
at 58. 
88.  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Commissioner Ed Willett, Address at 
the National Telecommunications Summit 2005, Melbourne, The State of Competition in the 
Telecommunications Industry (May 30, 2005), [hereinafter Willett Speech], at 10. 
89.  See id. 
90.  See id. 
91.  See id. at 9 (“While service based competition will take us some way, especially if 
fuelled by the incumbents wishes to maintain market share, infrastructure based competition seems 
to provide more rapid and sustainable development.”). 
92.  Id. at 7 (“Further progress therefore relies on a move to more infrastructure based 
competition. This is not a new conclusion; the ACCC has stood by this contention since 1997 when 
the current regulatory regime began.”). 
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In December of 2004, the ACCC issued its Final Report declining to declare 
domestic roaming rate regulation.
93 With regard to GSM roaming, the 
Commission noted that it was “not satisfied that declaration of the domestic inter-
carrier roaming service will promote the LTIE [long term interest of end-
users].”
94 This decision followed—by roughly six years—a previous ACCC 
report that had also declined to declare domestic roaming as a regulated service.
95 
The  Final Report represents the first of several forbearance efforts that, 
cumulatively, demonstrated a willingness by the ACCC to forbear from the 
declaration of additional telecommunication regulations. The Final Report also 
recognized the depth of Australian mobile telecommunications competition,
96 
and noted that the ACCC “should not impose regulated access” for competitive 
services.
97 Thus the ACCC’s demonstrated forbearance, and its clear statement 
that unbundling would not be imposed in the face of significant competition, 
appear to have collectively provided Telstra with the confidence to fully invest in 
its 3G network. 
In coming to its decision, the ACCC deemed GSM roaming services to be 
competitive. The Commission solicited comments from each of the four 
Australian mobile carriers, Hutchison Telecoms, SingTel Optus (Singapore 
Telecommunications Ltd.), Telstra, and Vodafone. The Commission found that 
the largest two users of roaming services, Vodafone and Hutchinson,
98 both 
“appear to be satisfied with the agreements that they have negotiated to roam on 
the networks of other carriers.”
99 Hutchison, in particular, is quoted as 




93.  Id. 
94.  Id. at 58. Regarding GSM, the Commission wrote “[i]n light of current supply 
arrangements, and in the absence of recent complaints concerning GSM domestic inter-carrier 
roaming, the Commission is not satisfied that declaration of a service covering GSM networks will 
promote competition.” Id. at 57. Regarding CDMA, “the Commission does not consider that it has 
sufficient information to form the view that declaration [of CDMA roaming service] will promote 
competition.” Id. at 57. 
95.  Public Inquiry into Declaration of Domestic Intercarrier Roaming Under Part XIC of the 
Trade Practices Act of 1974, Report Prepared Pursuant to Section 505 of the Telecommunications 
Act 1997, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Mar. 1997 [hereinafter 1997 
Inquiry]. 
96.   For example, the ACCC noted that the three major carriers—Telstra, Optus (SingTel), 
and Vodafone—each provide service to more than 90 percent of Australia’s population. See ACCC 
Final Report, supra note 87, at 34-35 (“The Commission understands that Telstra’s CDMA and 
GSM networks cover 98 percent and 96 percent of the Australian population respectively. Optus’s 
GSM network covers more than 94 percent of the Australian population and Vodafone’s GSM 
network covers approximately 92 percent.”).
97.  Id., at 6 (“Where existing market conditions already provide for the competitive supply of 
services, the access regime should not impose regulated access.”).
98.  The determination that Vodafone and Hutchison are the largest users of Australian 
roaming services is based on carriers’ reported roaming agreements. See, for example, ACCC Final 
Report, supra note 93, at 28-29. (“In [the national GSM inter-carrier roaming services] market, 
there are two current suppliers of national inter-carrier roaming services – Telstra and Vodafone. 
Relevant roaming agreements include: Telstra/Vodafone…Vodafone/Hutchison…[and] 
Vodafone/Globalstar.”) 
99. Id. at 30. 
100. Mobile Services Review 2003, Submission to the Australian Competition & Consumer 
Commission (public version), Hutchison Telecommunications (Australia) Limited and Hutchison 
3G Australia Pty Limited, June 13, 2003, at 23. 
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Although the Final Report was issued before the advent of 3G service in 
Australia, the ACCC made clear that any future declaration of mobile roaming 
services would also apply to 3G technology. At the time, the ACCC had limited 
its examination to GSM and CDMA roaming services,
101 which were the only 
two standards then in operation. 3G, as a successor standard, could have been 
subject to any regulatory decisions imposed on CDMA or GSM. The 
Commission noted the link between mobile standards, suggesting that existing 
“agreements provide for the supply of roaming services to other 2G and 2.5G 
mobile network operators, as well as 3G network operators…”
102 Similarly, a 
speech by ACCC Chairman Graeme Samuel noted that 2G (CDMA and GSM) 
and 3G networks were both subject to what it calls “voice terminating access 
services.”
103 As a result, the Commission’s decision to forbear from domestic 
mobile roaming regulation provided some confidence that 3G networks, when 
completed, would be treated in a similar manner. 
B.  ACCC Forbearance from International Mobile Roaming Declaration 
The ACCC reinforced its commitment to regulatory forbearance when, in 
September 2005, it similarly declined to declare an international mobile roaming 
service.
104 In its review, the Commission states that “[t]o date, the Commission 
has not considered it necessary to take enforcement or regulatory action in 
relation to pricing of wholesale or retail international roaming services.”
105 
Although only a small number of mobile subscribers use international roaming 
services
106—and thus the impact of an international roaming service is likely to 
be less than that of a domestic Australian roaming service—the Commission’s 
decision further clarified and strengthened its commitment not to impose 
mandatory unbundling in the face of evidence of wireless competition.   
C.  ACCC Forbearance from 3G Declaration 
The two roaming decisions created a foundation for a credible commitment 
by the ACCC to forbear from declaring 3G wireless service.  In October 2006, 
 
101. GSM and CDMA are mobile telephony standards. GSM is the most common worldwide, 
particularly in Europe. CDMA is the most popular standard in the United States (although 3G 
technology, which is based on GSM, is also coming into service). 
102.  ACCC Final Report, supra note 93, at 57. 
103.  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Chairman Graeme Samuel, 
Address at the RACV Club 501, Business Forum (Oct. 26, 2006) [hereinafter Samuel Address], at 
3. Quotation is based on Mr. Samuel’s speaking notes, which are available at: 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/item.phtml?itemId=768517&nodeId= 
f37c29f8d506f2bb5b3715768728d1cd&fn=Telecommunications%20and%20Media.pdf. (“...an 
outcome of the Mobile Services Review is that all mobile providers are obliged to supply a voice 
terminating access service…it applies to all their mobile networks, regardless of whether it is a 2G 
or a 3G network.”) 
104.  Mobile Services Review, International Inter-carrier Roaming, A Final Report on the 
Provision of International Inter-carrier Roaming Services, Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission, Sept. 2005. 
105. Id. at 53. 
106. Id. at 6. (“Review suggests that the number of mobile phone subscribers who use 
international roaming services represent only a small proportion of all mobile phone subscribers. 
For example, Optus indicated in its submission that less than 2% of its total mobile subscriber base 
used international roaming services as of June 2003.”) Optus figures from SingTel Optus, 
Submission to ACCC on Mobile Services, June 2003, para. 9.9. 
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for example, ACCC Chairman Graeme Samuel stated that “[t]he declaration of a 
resale mobile service (for example, wholesale end-to-end mobile service) that 
Optus appears to be advocating in relation to Telstra’s 3G ‘Next G’ 850 MHz 
network has not been contemplated by the ACCC,”
107 explaining that while the 
Commission is “committed to the ongoing monitoring of this commercial 
environment,”
108 “[s]ince the Mobile Services Review, the Commission has not 
seen a need to take any steps towards declaring any other services…on mobile 
networks.”
109 Chairman Samuel’s comments effectively confirmed what market 
participants already knew:  Based on its prior decisions, the ACCC was unlikely 
to demand unbundling of 3G wireless networks.  
Evidence also suggests that the ACCC grasps the link between regulatory 
forbearance and efficient infrastructure investment. The Chairman began his 
discussion of Telstra’s 3G network by characterizing the mobile telephony 
market as more competitive—and thus less likely to need regulation—than 
wireline services,
110 and noted the extent of current 3G infrastructure investment, 
including network investments by Hutchison, Telstra, Optus, and Vodafone.
111 
He explained that “Telstra properly seeks certainty for its new infrastructure 
investment,”
112 and he intimated that “the ACCC has long recognized the more 
enduring benefits of efficient facilities-based competition.”
113
D. Incumbent Responded to Regulatory Forbearance by Increasing Capital 
Investment 
The ACCC’s treatment of 3G wireless services also sheds light on the 
importance of credible regulatory commitment for investment decisions.  We 
examined how Telstra’s mobile telephony capital expenditures responded to the 
Commission’s forbearance decisions. Our analysis encompasses the years 2001-
2007, a period preceding and including the deployment of Telstra’s 3G mobile 
services. To account for subscriber growth, we measured mobile capital 
expenditures on a per-mobile line basis. In addition, we tracked the deployment 
of Telstra’s 3G network as another (albeit likely lagged) measure of the strength 
and pace of 3G investment. 
As displayed in Figure 6, Telstra’s mobile telephony capital expenditures 
increased significantly following the issuance of the ACCC’s international 
roaming service forbearance decision. Before forbearance (particularly the 
international roaming decision), Telstra’s mobile capital expenditures per line 
ranged between $15 and $45 per line.   Once the regulator credibly committed to 
forbear, however, investment roughly doubled, to approximately $60 per line. 
 
107. Samuel  Address, supra note 103, at 4.  
108. Id. at 4. 
109.  Id. at 4. 
110.  Id. at 4. Specifically, under the heading “Telstra’s third-generation Next G network,” 
the Chairman notes that “the retail mobile services market is exhibiting more encouraging market 
outcomes than the markets for fixed-line telecommunications services.” 
111.  Id. at 1 (“Technologies at the center of the transformation [of telecommunications 
companies to provide media]:…3G mobile telephone – Hutchison (2 years), Telstra, Optus, 
Vodafone. All similar speeds developing to around 14.4 14.4 Mbps with HSDPA (high speed 
downlink packet access) towards middle 2007.”) 
112 Id. at 4. 
113. Id. at 4. In addition, see the Chairman’s recommended paths to regulatory certainty as 
discussed supra at note 103. 
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FIGURE 6: TELSTRA MOBILE CAPITAL EXPENDITURES PER  
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12/04: ACCC mobile 
domestic roaming forbearance
9/05: ACCC mobile international 
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forbearance announced
 
Sources: Telstra Full Year and Half Year company reviews.  
Note: Capital expenditures are in nominal terms. 
 
Figure 6 suggests that positive incumbent response requires the clarity 
provided by multiple forbearance decisions. Specifically, the sharp increase 
following the second forbearance decision (regarding international mobile 
roaming service) suggests that Telstra committed to its 3G investment after the 
ACCC had bolstered its forbearance credentials with its international roaming 
decision. The second decision likely was interpreted by Telstra to mean that the 
ACCC would forbear from regulating a new 3G network as well, a decision 
confirmed by Chairman Samuel’s later comments. 
Telstra’s 3G infrastructure investment may also have been encouraged by 3G 
investments made by other market participants, because these investments would 
have made a declaration of 3G service more difficult politically. Any regulation 
of 3G services would necessarily have included all operators which had made 
substantial investments in 3G networks, including the (smaller) Vodafone and 
Hutchison networks.
114 As a result, these firms would also stand to lose if their 
                                                      
114. Regarding  Vodafone,  see Jeremy Roche, Vodafone Australia to Launch 3G in October, 
ZDNET  AUSTRALIA, July 27, 2005, available at  http://www.zdnet.com.au/ 
news/communications/soa/Vodafone-Australia-to-launch-3G-in-October/0,130061791, 
139204328,00.htm. (“Vodafone today announced its third-generation (3G) network would be 
commercially launched in Sydney, Melbourne, and Canberra this October – rolling out to Brisbane, 
Adelaide, and Perth in early 2006.”). Regarding Hutchison, see James Pearce, 3’s a 
Company…Finally, ZDNET  AUSTRALIA, Apr. 15, 2003, available at 
http://www.zdnet.com.au/news/communications/soa/3-s-a-company-finally/0,130061791, 
120273730,00.htm. (“Hutchison launched its ‘3’ mobile service in Australia today…”). 
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3G networks were opened to other mobile telephone entrants, and would thus 
likely oppose a declaration of 3G services. It is possible that Telstra took these 
regulatory incentives into account as well when it decided to invest in a 
nationwide 3G network. 
While it appears that the ACCC’s 2004 and 2005 decisions were effective in 
persuading some market participants of its intentions to forbear, it also seems that 
others remained unconvinced.  For example, Optus limited its investment in 3G 
to a partnership with Vodafone,
115 which covered a small urban footprint, and 
initially was limited to major cities and several airports.
116 Only after Chairman 
Samuel’s October 2006 declaration that the ACCC would not force Telstra to 
open its 3G network to competitors (including Optus), did Optus (in January 
2007) announce plans to develop its own nationwide 3G network.
117 Thus, it 
appears that while the ACCC’s forbearance signals may have been understood 
and accepted by at least some market participants, it was unsuccessful in credibly 
communicating its intentions to Optus. 
  
VI. CONCLUSION 
This is the first paper to examine the investment behavior of incumbents and 
entrants around the time of regulatory forbearance decisions. We find evidence 
that an entrant will significantly increase investment around the decision to 
forbear from regulating an existing access technology. We also find evidence that 
an incumbent will significantly increase investment around the decision to 
forbear from regulating a new service. While our results do not impugn the 
theoretical underpinnings of the stepping stone model, they do suggest that a key 
assumption of the model – that regulators can credibly signal their intentions to 
follow the model’s recommendations – cannot be taken for granted.  Indeed, in 
all three of our case studies, it appears that at least some market participants 
failed accurately to assess the regulator’s intentions. 
These findings suggest that robust facilities-based competition—the primary 
goal of unbundled access regulation—is better served by moving forward the 
date of regulatory forbearance than by gradually relaxing unbundling 
requirements. Because it is difficult for a regulator to credibly commit to 
removing an unbundling obligation at some future date, the best strategy for an 
entrant is to defer investment (and continue leasing access at regulated rates) 
until the time of forbearance. It is an even harder for a regulator to commit to 
forbearing from regulating a new service in the future. Whereas the regulator can 
signal its commitment to deregulate at some future date by adjusting wholesale 
rates upwards in the case of existing access technologies, no such policy 
 




116.  Id. (“Optus today launched its 3G services in Sydney, Canberra, Melbourne, 
Brisbane’s CBD and Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth airports.”). 
117.  Optus, Optus Announces Bold Expansion of Its 3G Mobile Network Across National 
Footprint, Press Release, Jan. 30, 2007, available at http://www.optus.com.au/ 
portal/site/aboutoptus/menuitem.813c6f701cee5a14f0419f108c8ac7a0/?vgnextoid=27e13268b6070
110VgnVCM10000029867c0aRCRD&vgnextchannel=daf6d7ef03820110VgnVCM10000029867c
0aRCRD&vgnextfmt=default. Note also that new portions of the 3G network will be owned 
exclusively by Optus, rather than through a partnership of Optus and Vodafone. 
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instrument exists in the case of a new technology. Thus, expediting the date of 
forbearance is even more critical for stimulating investment in new technologies. 
32 